Researchers sometimes argue that statisticians have little to contribute when few realizations of the process being estimated are observed. We show that this argument is incorrect even in the extreme situation of estimating the probabilities of events so rare that they have never occurred. We show how statistical forecasting models allow us to use empirical data to improve inferences about the probabilities of these events.
Introduction
When an event is so rare that it has never occurred, despite many trials, estimates of its probability would seem to be a theoretical matter about which statisticians have little to contribute. Through a political science election analysis example, we demonstrate that statistical models can be used to extract information from related data to yield better estimates of the probabilities of even extraordinarily rare events.
Our application is a more extreme example of decision analyses that require the assessment of subjective probabilities. Our results are related to examples from space shuttle safety (see Martz and Zimmer, 1992) , record linkage (see Belin and Rubin, 1995) , and DNA matching (see Sudbury, Marinopoulos, and Gunn, 1993, and Belin, Gjertson, and Hu, 1995) , where scholars have also found that probabilities estimated using data-based statistical methods are much better calibrated than probabilities assigned by theoretical mathematical models. These elds are like election analysis in that data-free models, typically based on independence assumptions, have led to mistaken conclusions. Our work is also related to analyses that seek to improve estimation by supplementing data sets that have a small (but nonzero) number of rare events with precursor data (Bier, 1993) or additional carefully selected observations (Sanchez and Higle, 1992) .
We estimate the probability that an individual's vote is decisive in U.S. presidential elections. Given the size of the electorate, an election where one vote is decisive (equivalent to a tie in your state and in the electoral college) will almost certainly never occur. Nevertheless, political scientists have sought an estimate of this event through systematic theoretical analyses for over two decades and via informed speculation for much longer (see Beck, 1975) .
Although the exact value of the probability of one vote being decisive is a minor issue in and of itself, it turns out to lie at the heart of several important lines of inquiry.
For one, the perception of the probability that a single vote, or block of votes, will be decisive, governs the optimal allocation of campaign resources. Understanding political campaigns and the behavior of political candidates thus involves estimating the probability that a vote will be decisive in each state or region. Candidates for o ce are also obviously interested in these estimates in order to maximize their chances of winning. States and various voter groups trying to ensure that they get a fair share of attention from prospective o ce holders are also interested, since attention during the campaign relates to how they will be treated by the occupant of the White House after the election.
Normatively, many political scientists nd electoral systems undesirable if some voter groups are more likely than others to in uence an election outcome. For example, the variation from state to state in the probability that your vote is decisive in a U.S. presidential election is often addressed in terms of whether the electoral college favors voters in large or small states (see Banzhaf, 1968; Brams and Davis, 1974; and Merrill, 1978) or whether the electoral college as a whole treats the political parties equally (Abbott and Levine, 1991) .
(The winner of the presidential election is the candidate who receives a majority of votes from the 538 electoral college delegates. The plurality winner of each state chooses all the electoral college delegates assigned to that state. The number of delegates is determined by the number of senators plus the number of congressional representatives from each state.
We ignore minor exceptions such as Maine's rule that allows their electoral college delegates to be split, delegates deciding to vote for candidates other than for whom they were chosen, and complications caused by third party candidates who get large fractions of the vote.)
From the standpoint of normative philosophy, an election in a democratic system should allow the possibility that a single vote can matter; some believe it is desirable to design electoral systems so that the probability of this outcome is relatively high.
Finally, from a \rational choice" perspective, voting becomes more desirable as the probability of it making a di erence increases. Di erent researchers give di erent numbers for the probability that one vote is decisive, but all agree it is low enough that, considering only the immediate personal costs of voting and direct personal gains from in uencing the outcome, it is \irrational" for most Americans to vote in the presidential election (see Riker and Ordeshook, 1968 , Barzel and Silberberg, 1973 , Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1974 , Jackman, 1987 , Aldrich, 1993 , and Green and Shapiro, 1993 . Scholars in this sub eld have at times been consumed with trying to explain, through mathematical models of voter choice, why \so many" people bother to vote (given rational choice assumptions). Thus, estimates of the probability of tied elections play a role in understanding or resolving this central puzzle.
(Many reasons for voting other than direct personal gain from the election outcome can also be given, but scholars in this sub eld have sought to build mathematical models that explain why people vote with only minimal modi cations of their parsimonious behavioral assumptions.)
In this paper, we use a standard model for forecasting presidential elections to estimate the probability that a single vote will be decisive, for voters in each state in every postwar election. We also perform some more approximate calculations to estimate the average probability that one vote will be decisive in a U.S. congressional election and in elections in general. Sections 2 and 3 of the paper lay out the theoretical framework for estimating the probability of a decisive vote in the electoral college; Section 4 gives numerical details of our implementation with historical data; Section 5 discusses other elections; and Section 6 discusses the implications of our methods for studies of voting in particular and decision theory in general.
2 The factors that determine the probability that your vote is decisive
Interpretation in terms of forecasts
The question, \What is the probability that your vote will be decisive?" is inherently about uncertainty in the outcome of the election, given the information available to you before the election. Thus, to answer this question in even an approximately calibrated way, one must model the uncertainty in the pre-election period. The uncertainty could be measured in many ways, depending on what information is available at the time of the forecast. For this paper, we use presidential election forecasting methods based on national and state economic and political variables available a few months before the election, as in Rosenstone (1984) and Campbell (1992) . As discussed by Gelman and King (1993) , these forecasts predict the election about as accurately as polls taken a few days before the election. In fact, no method|including the predictions of informed observers, political insiders, media pundits, sample surveys, or other types of expert analysis or nonstatistical predictions|has been shown to outperform these forecasts. As such, although our model is conditional on the information publically available prior to the general election campaign that we included in our model, this is nearly equivalent to conditioning on all the information available that an individual voter would have just prior to election day. (The puzzling implication, that the campaign has little net e ect despite huge sums spent and wide uctuations in voter preference polls over time, is studied by Gelman and King, 1993.) In any case, the following factors will almost necessarily be involved in the probability that your vote will be decisive in a presidential election. First, the probability that your state election is tied depends on (1) the forecast vote share for the two candidates, (2) the uncertainty in that forecast (a Democratic vote share forecast at 0:51 0:02 is more likely to be a tie than with a forecast of 0:51 0:10), and (3) the number of voters in your state (to yield the probability of an exact tie). Next, the probability that your state, if tied, will be decisive in the national electoral vote total depends on (4) the number of electoral votes assigned to your state, and (5) the approximate proximity of the state to the national median vote.
Comparison to theoretical models of voting
Most of the literature that has appeared so far on the e ects of individual votes has focused on formal probabilistic models of voting, generally based on a model of binomial (see Beck, 1975; Margolis, 1977) or at best compound binomial variation (Chamberlain and Rothchild, 1981) of the votes within each state. The probabilities produced by such models do not correspond, even approximately, to the state of uncertainty of participants in the political process before the election. In particular, the formal mathematical models typically assume that the probability of a vote being decisive depends only on the electoral vote and turnout (or, worse, population) in each state|thus ignoring factors (1) and (5)|and further assume that the variability (2) is determined by binomial variation (an assumption not warranted by the data, as we discuss at the end of Section 4.1 and in Section 6.2). Merrill (1978) allows the probabilities to vary by state, but does not allow the parameters for states to vary over time or with the closeness of the election.
Other work in this eld, based on game-theoretic ideas (such as Banzhaf, 1968; and Brams and Davis, 1974) , avoids explicit probability models but can be seen implicitly to assume that votes are assigned at random. (For example, a voting power measure based on counting the number of winning coalitions for which your vote would be decisive is equivalent to determining the probability that your vote will be decisive, under the assumption that all the other actors vote by ipping coins.) More recent game-theoretic analyses (such as Feddersen, 1992) , which allow votes to depend on additional information, also implicitly assume that the variability (2) approaches zero if the number of voters is large.
3 Using election forecasts to compute the probability that a vote will be decisive
Your presidential vote will be decisive if two conditions are satis ed. First, without your vote, your state's election outcome must be exactly tied or one vote away from a tie. (We consider the case of a person who will either vote for one candidate not vote. A voter who is considering switching from the Democratic to Republican candidate will, of course, have a higher probability of being decisive.) Second, your state must be decisive in the national election: given that it is tied, neither party must have an electoral vote majority.
We introduce the following mathematical notation for the following known constants: Because the District of Columbia is an unambiguous outlier, and easily predictable, we assume that its 3 electoral votes are certain to go to the Democrats. This is not a controversial coding decision (e.g., Rosenstone, 1983) . (One can crudely account for minor parties by separately estimating which states will be won by minor parties and setting E to the total number of electoral votes in the states contested by the Democrats and the Republicans.)
Then, if you live in state i, Pr(your vote matters) = Pr(your vote is decisive in your state) Pr(your state will be decisive j your vote is decisive in your state) (1) The second factor on the right side of (1) is a conditional probability: the probability that state i will be decisive, given a popular vote tie in that state.
We now describe how to evaluate (1) given any state-by-state forecast of the presidential election (that is, the values n i and v i for all fty states). In practice, n i can be fairly accurately and uncontroversially estimated from previous elections, even ignoring the slightly higher turnout that may accompany closer contests. Since also electoral votes are known, we require a forecast of the vector of vote shares, (v 1 ; : : : ; v 50 ), representing some state of knowledge before the presidential election in question. Such a forecast is an input to our method and, like all statistical forecasts, must include uncertainty as well as a point estimate. In addition, separate forecasts for all the states are not enough; it must be a joint forecast so that the conditional probability in (1) can be determined (for example, to nd the probability that Utah|a strongly Republican state|will be decisive in the unlikely event that it is tied). We compute the two factors of (1) 
using the discrete approximation to the continuous distribution and the notation f vi for the probability density function for the continuous variable v i under the forecasting model.
Similarly, if n i is odd, the rst factor in (1) is Pr(n i v i = 0:5(n i ?1)) = Pr(v i = 0:5?0:5=n i ) f vi (0:5)=n i also, assuming that n i is reasonably large.
We can compute the second factor on the right side of (1) (The factors of 1 2 arise because a vote that causes the national election to be tied is only half as decisive as a vote that changes the election outcome.) The conditional forecasts of the other 49 states must then be combined into a forecast of the national electoral vote.
Computation
The two factors on the right side of (1), which are given by (2) and (3), can be computed using posterior simulations, using analytic expressions where necessary to avoid having to estimate very low probabilities directly by simulation. The rst step is to estimate all the parameters in the model or, in a Bayesian context, obtain a large number of simulations (e.g., 1000) of the vector of model parameters. For each state i and each draw of the simulated parameter vector, one can then compute f vi (0:5)=n i conditional on the model parameters.
The probability (2) can then be estimated as the average of these 1000 values.
The next step, to compute (3) for each state, is more complicated, because it is conditional on the event v i = 0:5. For each state i, one must re-estimate the model, conditional on v i = 0:5 (i.e., including the event v i = 0:5 as additional \data" when tting the model), and obtain a new set of 1000 simulations of the model parameters. For each of these 1000 draws, one must then simulate a draw from the predictive distribution of the vector of outcomes v j in the other 49 states, and from those compute the value of E ?i . Expression (3) can then be estimated for state i using the empirical probabilities from the 1000 simulated values of E ?i .
When the probability (3) is very low, perhaps even less than 1/1000 (for example, for a small state that is much more Republican than the national average), the estimate obtained above may be unacceptably variable. In this case, if one desires a less variable estimate without having to draw many more simulations, one can analytically approximate the distribution of E ?i and use that to compute (3). We have found in our simulations that a beta distribution on (E ?i ? 3)=(e total ? 3 ? e i ), t to the rst two moments of the drawn E ?i values, works quite well, as we discuss at the end of Section 4.2. We chose this particular distribution because E ?i is restricted to the range 3; e total ? e i ].
4 Results under a particular forecasting model
The forecasting model
For this paper, we use a method of forecasting presidential elections based on a hierarchical linear regression model described in Boscardin and Gelman (1996) , which adds a heteroskedastic speci cation to the model developed in Gelman and King (1993) . These models are generalizations of standard methods in political science for forecasting based on past election results, economic data, poll results, and other political information. (See Campbell, 1992 , and Section 1 of Gelman and King, 1993 , for more references and discussion of the political context. Similar models have been e ective for forecasting election results in other countries as well; see, e.g., Bernardo, 1986, and Bernardo and Giron, 1992 Gelman and King (1993) discuss the choice of these predictor variables, estimate the additional uncertainty due to the choice of speci cation, and provide evidence about the t of the model. Boscardin and Gelman (1996) provide further tests, including the regional random e ect terms and a heteroskedastic variance function. We omit the details of model choice and model tting here because the approach presented in this paper is designed to apply to any probabilistic forecast.
The regression coe cients and the variances of the error terms are estimated using data from the 1948 through 1988 elections. All error terms are assumed normally distributed (an assumption not contradicted by our data|that is, there was no noticeable skewness or outliers). The regional and national error terms are vital for our purposes because they can a ect the second factor in equation (1). Improvements in the forecast, for example by modeling correlations between states or across election years, or including information from other sources such as state opinion polls, could be incorporated by altering the covariance structure or adding more explanatory variables, without altering the essential form of the model.
In addition, our forecasting model allows for unequal variances in the error terms it , a fairly minor point for forecasting but potentially crucial for estimating the state-to-state variation in the probability that your vote will be decisive. State-by-state presidential election forecasting methods in the political science literature (e.g., Rosenstone, 1984 , Campbell, 1992 generally assume equal variances. In contrast, the theoretical models of voting generally assume binomial variation; that is, var( it ) proportional to n ?1 it . In order to include both possibilities in the same model, we t a model in which var( it ) = n ? it 2 , where is a parameter that varies between 0 (as in the forecasting models) and 1 (as in the theoretical models) that is estimated from the data. For our regression model, we obtained a 95% interval for of 0:09; 0:36], with estimated standard deviations of about 2.5%, 2.5%, 5.0%, and 3.5%, for the national, regional (outside the South), regional (the South), and state-level error terms.
The probability that your vote will be decisive
We estimate the parameters in our model using Bayesian simulation (see Boscardin and Gelman, 1996) , and our estimates yield a matrix of 1250 simulations of the parameter vector ( ; 2 ; ; 1 ; : : : ; 4 ; ) from their posterior distribution. (We also obtain simulations of the parameters and for the election years 1948{1988, and their model variances, parameters not required for computing the probability that a single vote is decisive in 1992.) For convenience, we suppress the subscript t, as we are forecasting only one election at a time.
For each simulated parameter vector, the probability that state i is tied or one vote less than tied|that is, expression (2) 
where N(xj ; 2 ) is the normal density function. Expression (5) depends on n i , the voter turnout in state i, which is unknown before the election. To compute (5), we use an estimate of n i obtained by scaling the turnout from the previous presidential election by the increase in the voting age population in the state in the previous four years. This correction is not precise, but errors in the turnout have simple and relatively minor e ects on the estimated probabilities. For each state i, we then estimate (2) by averaging the probabilities (5) over the 1250 simulations of the parameter vector; this is the correct estimated probability of a tie or near-tie given the Bayesian simulations.
For each state i, we now compute the conditional probability that the state is decisive,
given that it is tied, in two steps. Figure 4 plots the estimate of (3) based on the empirical frequencies vs. the estimate based on tting beta distributions, as described at the end of Section 3.1. The estimates are quite similar, and so we use the estimates based on the beta approximation so that the estimates of the low probabilities will be more stable using this moderate number of simulation draws.
Numerical results
We used these simulations to compute the probability that a single vote would decide the election in each state for each of the presidential election years from 1952 to 1992, excluding 1968, when a third party candidate won several states. Figure 1a displays, for the 1992 election, the probability that a single vote is decisive versus the number of electoral votes in each state. The probability is about one in ten million for all states. Voters in some of the smaller politically moderate states have a larger chance (e.g., one in 3.5 million in Vermont), while those in more extreme states (such as Utah and Nebraska) have a smaller chance: if the votes in a politically extreme state is tied, the probability is very low of a close election at the national level. For six of the elections, the probability is fairly independent of state size (slightly higher for the smallest states) and is near one in ten million. For the other three elections (1964, 1972, and 1984, corresponding to the landslide victories of Johnson, Nixon, and Reagan), the probability is much smaller: on the order of one in hundreds of millions for all the states. This strong dependence of the estimated probability on the size of the victory margin invalidates most of the existing theoretical models. Of course, the probabilities of decisive votes in the landslide elections are sensitive to the tail behavior of our forecasting model|we trust the qualitative ndings but would rely less strongly on the exact numerical results.
By way of comparison, we estimate the chance that a single vote would be decisive if the popular vote decided the election. The posterior predictive distribution for popular vote in 1992 is easily estimated by the simulations: it is roughly normal with mean 51.5% and standard deviation 5.6%. With about 92 million people predicted to vote, the chance that it would have been an exact tie is approximately 1 in 13.3 million. The electoral college system places a slightly larger importance on the individual votes from all but eight of the states in 1992.
5 Approximate results for U.S. Congressional and other elections
As an external check on our model, we estimate the probability that any generic election is tied using equation (2). Suppose n people vote in the election, and the forecast is a normal distribution with mean and standard deviation ; then the probability that a single vote will be decisive is approximately ( p 2 n) ?1 exp(?( ?0:5) 2 =(2 2 )), as discussed by Margolis (1977) . One way to interpret this result is in terms of upper bounds. The probability of a tie is clearly maximized at = 0:5. As for , it is hard to imagine a real election that could be forecast to within a standard error of less than, say, 2% of the vote. This yields 20=n as an upper bound on the probability that your vote is decisive in a close election.
A typical value of n for an election to the U.S. Congress is 200;000, which gives an upper bound of 1 in 10;000 of your vote making a di erence. Another way to look at this is that, even in the closest elections, it is not in practice possible to forecast the outcome to within less than about 10;000 votes. Of course, most Congressional elections are not forecast to be so close and so the probability of a tie is usually much lower.
Another way to attack the problem is empirically, by averaging over past election outcomes. In the period 1900{1992, there were 20;597 U.S. House elections, out of which 6 were decided by fewer than 10 votes, 49 by fewer than 100 votes, 293 by fewer than 500 votes, and 585 by fewer than 1000 votes. This suggests a frequency probability of about 0:5=20;597 that a single vote will be decisive in a randomly-chosen U.S. House election. This number is of course much less than our upper bound of 1=10;000 because most of the elections were not close.
For U.S. presidential elections, a similar rough calculation reveals that 18% of the state election results v i in our dataset lay between 0.48 and 0.52. This suggests, for a state with n i voters, an estimated probability of 0:18=(0:04n i ) for the event that v i is exactly 0:5 (if n i is even) or exactly 0:5 ? 0:5=n i (if n i is odd). We can perform a similar calculation for the probability that a state is decisive in the electoral college: of the 11 presidential elections in 1948{1988, 2 were close enough that switching 50 electoral votes would decide the election. This suggests, for a state with e i electoral votes, an estimated probability of about 1 2 (2=11)(e i =50) that a vote that is decisive in a state will swing the national election. (The factor of 1=2 applies because we are considering the e ect of casting a vote, not the e ect of switching a preference from one party to the other.) Multiplying the two factors yields a combined probability of 0:008e i =n i that an individual vote will be decisive. For example, a voter in a medium-sized state with 10 electoral votes and a turnout of 2 million would have an estimated probability of 1 in 25 million of casting a decisive vote. This number is consistent with our estimates based on the forecasting model averaging over all election years.
For the presidential elections, we present the above approximate frequency calculations as a numerical check, but for the substantive political analysis, we prefer the forecast-based estimates because they condition on relevant information about the closeness of the election, the voting pattern in each state, and so forth, as discussed in Section 2.1. Contrary to Davis (1973, 1974) and Banzhaf (1968) , we do not nd a \bias" in favor of large states. The largest biases are (1) Our results and general methodology are of obvious interest to candidates deciding how to allocate their campaign resources and states concerned about attracting the attention of prospective presidents. In general, the probability of in uencing the election outcome by mobilizing N supporters to vote in a single state is roughly N times the probability that a single vote in that state will be decisive, and so state-by-state campaign e orts can be chosen to maximize that probability, with the optimal decision varying as the campaign progresses and the election forecasts change. This point is discussed by Davis (1973, 1974) . Similarly, the probability of swinging the election by changing the preferences of N voters in a single state is roughly 2N times the probability that a single vote in that state will be decisive.
In addition, our results are of interest to rational choice theorists interested in the rationality of the decision of the individual citizen whether to vote; of course, one must also account for the possibility that the voter may in uence other, non-presidential contests at the ballot box.
6.2 Mathematical discussion of our results and comparison to methods not based on forecasts
The probability of a tie in a state is on the order of 1=n i , and the probability that a state will be decisive given that is tied is (crudely) proportional to e i , which is roughly proportional to n i (except in the smallest states). Therefore, we expect the product of these two factors
to be approximately constant with a slight advantage to the smallest states. To illustrate, Figure 3 plots, for 1992, the log probability that a state will be decisive given that it is tied versus the log probability that it will be tied. Most of the points lie close to the dotted line indicating a probability of 10 ?7 .
Many of the theoretical models in this literature (see Section 1) assume that the standard deviation of v i in a state is proportional to 1= p n i . Our model can replicate this assumption by xing the value of to be exactly 1 (see expression (5)). We were interested whether our ndings would change measurably with such an assumption, so we performed this computation. Figure 2 shows the results for 1992 and previous years: the probability that a single vote will be decisive increases slightly for the very largest states, but only slightly and not to the extent anticipated by the binomial-based models. This is because the forecasting model has several variance components, and the regional and national errors do not, of course, vary by state size. Our results are not as sensitive to the parameter as one might fear.
Future analysts may therefore wish to opt for the simpler homoskedastic regression-based forecasts in Gelman and King (1993) .
Another possible modeling choice is the compound binomial: modeling an expected vote outcome u i using a linear model as done in this paper, and then modeling votes by a binomial distribution: n i v i Bin(n i ; u i ). Although this class of models seems reasonable, we do not adopt it because, in practice, the turnout in U.S. elections is so large that the binomial variability is negligible compared to the forecast uncertainty in the model. For example, in 1992, turnout in all states was greater than 160000, and p (0:5)(0:5)=160000 = 0:00125, as compared to statewide error terms of about 0.03. Boscardin and Gelman (1996) also consider a generalization of the compound binomial model, tting an error variance of the form ( 2 1 + 2 2 =n i ). Results were very similar to those obtained from the power-law variance model shown here.
To return to more substantive concerns, we consider how the results would change as better information is added so as to increase the accuracy of the forecasts. In most states, this will have the e ect of reducing the chance of an exact tie; that is, adding information will bring the probability that one vote will be decisive even closer to zero. However, for a state that is close to evenly divided, the resulting probability will continue to increase as more information is added. In reality, one cannot achieve arbitrary precision in the forecasts.
Even for the most knowledgeable observers on the morning of election day, there is quite a bit of uncertainty in the day's outcome.
Empirical forecasting vs. mathematical modeling|implications for decision theory and public choice
The probability of an unlikely event, such as an individual's vote being decisive in a nationwide election, can be estimated in a straightforward fashion as a byproduct of any forecasting system that includes forecasting uncertainty. The results are model-dependent, but the use of forecasting models is a strength because the models can be checked for accuracy and im-proved if they do not forecast well. For the case of presidential elections, we use extensions of standard forecasting methods to determine the probability of a vote being decisive for each state and nd results that make good political sense, but contradict many published ndings in this eld that are based on mathematical models not t to actual elections.
An alternative approach would be to attempt to assess subjective probabilities directly.
For example, one could poll individual voters to determine their perceived probabilities that the election will be a tie; however, people are notoriously poor at assessing probabilities that are close to zero (see Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982) . If interested in the e ect on campaign decisions, one could interview campaign organizations to determine their internal forecasts, or use the prognostications of informed commentators, although political science forecasting models are well-known to outperform the most eloquent media pundits.
Decision theorists have long noted the need for estimating subjective probabilities for expected utility calculations (e.g., Savage, 1954) . This is di cult when the events in question are so rare that they have never been observed to occur, and especially di cult in nonexperimental research where collecting more data is either infeasible or impossible. Our application demonstrates the utility of bringing related information to bear on improving the estimation of the probability of rare events. This is a useful addition to the tendency, at least in political science, to obtain probabilities through formal models with only minimal empirical input. The example of the probability of decisive voting illustrates the conceptual and substantive gains that can be made by returning to a forecasting basis for modeling uncertainties in decision making. 1960 1976 1980 1988 1956, 1952 1972, 1984 Figure 1: Probability that one vote decides the election, by state, versus electoral votes in the state for (a) 1992 and (b) 1952 through 1988 (excluding 1968) . In both gures, the solid lines were obtained by binning according to electoral votes and then averaging. -7 1960 1976 1980 1988 1956, 1952 1972, 1984 Figure 2: Same plot as in Figure 1 for model with set to 1 (that is, state-level variance inversely proportional to turnout). 
